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Abstract 
Ethnic conflicts arte one of the main hampering factors of the state’s security and development. Despite the fact that in this global 
world a lot is done for eradication of conflicts, in many parts of the world they still are a big threats periling global security. 
Conflict discussed in the article below was the first ethnic conflict of the USSR, which continued after its collapse and still takes 
place between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorny-Karabakh. Conflict hampers the security of the whole South Cauca-
sus region and strongly hinders regions development. 
Nagorny-Karabakh conflict that is one of the bloodiest disputes in South Caucasus was the beginning of the ethnic tensions in the 
Soviet Empire and together with many other reasons eventually lead to its collapse. 
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Introduction
The present article analyzes the conflict that still takes 
place in South Caucasus between two independent post-
Soviet countries: Armenia and Azerbaijan, about the re-
gion of Nagorny Karabakh.  The conflict that is one of the 
bloodiest disputes in South Caucasus initiated the ethnic 
tensions in the Soviet Empire and together with many other 
reasons eventually led to its collapse. 
Conflict started in 1988; it became a devastating fac-
tor not only for the Soviet Union itself, but also for the 
two main warring parties, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which 
became independent in 1991. 
So if during Soviet Union it was (1988-1991) it was 
the inner conflict of the USSR, from its collapse it became 
the conflict between two newly independent countries. 
Subsequently, more than 850 000 Azerbaijanis and 300 
000 Armenians were deported or ethnically cleansed from 
their homes. Full-Scale military hostilities ended with a 
shaky ceasefire, though 3000 people in total from the both 
sides have been killed in skirmishes along the boundary 
line since May 1994 ceasefire took effort. 
Emergence of the Conflict
No one can say exactly, what was the first reason that 
started the increasing disgust between people of two na-
tions; besides, during long time of Soviet Union they lived 
in peace, were neighbors, friends, were intermarried, and 
so on but by the end when National Movements started 
to flourish in post-soviet countries Armenians remembered 
that historically Nagorny karabakh was Armenian territory. 
The greatest problem of Nagorny Karabakh was that 
it was always in the middle. Geographically it is situated 
on the Azerbaijani side of the mountainous watershed that 
runs down between the two countries. Demographically 
it was mixed, as it evidently had been for centuries: the 
Armenian predominated in the hills with more Azerbaijani 
in the plains, as well as in the city of Shusha (or Shushi 
as it was known to its Armenian inhabitants). Culturally it 
had great significance for both sides. For Armenians, the 
meaning of Nagorny Karabakh lay in the dozens of Arme-
nian churches dotted around the territory, its tradition of 
local autonomy through the “melik” princes of the middle 
ages and the material reputation of Karabakh Armenians. 
For Azerbaijanis, the associations were primarily with the 
khanate based around the great eighteenth century city of 
Shusha and with the great cultural flowering of compos-
ers and poets such as Vagif, Natevan and Uzeir Hajibekov. 
Karabakh was in short a culturally rich border-zone and 
exactly because of it was always a place of battlefield. 
For centuries the region has had an allure. Karabakh 
has been famous for its mixed Christian-Muslim popula-
tion; for the independence of its rulers, whether Christian 
or Muslim; for being fought over by rival empires; for its 
forests and monasteries, for producing warriors and poets; 
for its grapes, mulberries, silk, and corn.
All conflicts have a pre-history. Few have as clear a 
beginning as the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. The basic po-
sitions – the Karabakh Armenians’ determination to secede 
from Azerbaijan with the support of Armenia and Azer-
baijanis’ resolve to stop that happening – were adopted in 
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February 1988 and that month saw turmoil erupt as if out 
of the blue in the form of demonstrations, strikes, political 
quarrels, flights of refugees and pogroms. That full-scale 
Armenian-Azerbaijani fighting only broke out at the end of 
1991 is more a matter of weaponry than of intention.
The events of February 1988 were dramatic, sudden, 
and almost universally unanticipated in a Europe that had 
all but forgotten the power of nationalism as a political 
force. In that sense, by being the first serious nationalist 
quarrel of the late Communist era, the Karabakh conflict 
can be called both the most unexpected and the most pre-
determined of all these disputes. More than any others in 
Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, the conflict was all but 
inevitable, because its causes lay in the ‘deep structure’ of 
the relationship between its two parties in late Communist 
times. Four elements – divergent national narratives, a 
disputed territorial boundary, an unstable security arrange-
ment and lack of dialogue between the two parties – had 
made fissures that would break Armenia and Azerbaijan 
apart, as soon as trouble began. Yet because the problem 
was both so new and so profound, no mechanism was 
found – or has yet been found – to repair the damage.
 
The Sides of the Conflict and the Parties Involved
Although according to today’s situation Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Nagorny-Karabakh are the parties directly 
involved in the conflict (though the concideration of Na-
gorny-Karabakh as a party is often highly disputed); the 
strategic interests of other countries are also at stake. As 
Caucasian countries, Azerbaijan and Armenia are part of 
the region that serves as a bridge between East and West, 
and between the territories of the former Soviet Union and 
the Islamic world. This causes many regional powers to 
be interested in the area, creating an unhealthy competi-
tion, often turning into a bitter rivalry, between them. As a 
result Nagorny Karabakh conflict remains frozen and unre-
solved. Besides strategic geopolitical location Azerbaijan 
also possesses vast oil and gas reserves. This has caused 
external powers such as the United States and EU become 
involved in the conflict. There are 7 major players in geo-
political game. There are: Russia, USA, EU, Iran, Turkey, 
Islamic World and even China (China can not be consid-
ered as a serious actor, just had a little appearance in the 
region and is in the shadow for sure). Many local analysts 
believe that Russia has been not only a geopolitical player 
in the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict, but also a direct partici-
pant in it. Although Russia denies this, there is plenty of 
evidence to support the claim. The conflict began when the 
Soviet Union was in its last years of existence, and thus the 
crumbling Soviet army and its military bases in the South 
Caucasus were drawn into the fighting.
Russia initially supplied weapons to both sides. This 
was done both at the level of corrupt local commanders, 
who were simply selling the weapons for private profit, as 
well as at state level owing to Moscow’s desire to keep 
both sides dependent on itself. Many analysts in both Baku 
and Yerevan believe that Russia intentionally fuelled the 
conflict in order to keep it alive and weaken newly in-
dependent Armenia and Azerbaijan, thus keeping them 
within its own orbit of influence. (In case of Azerbaijan 
weapon support from the side of Russia was mainly unoffi-
cial based mainly on corrupted private interests but in case 
of Armenia it was and still is official.)
At the moment, Russia is pursuing a somewhat more 
balanced policy on Nagorny-Karabakh compared to the 
mid-1990s because he has political interests in both of 
them. 
Washington has been tied to the Caucasus because of 
the vast energy reserves of the Caspian Sea and the region’s 
geostrategic importance in the war against terror. In addi-
tion, the strong, wealthy and active Armenian Diaspora in 
the United States has kept Washington’s attention focused 
on the area since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was 
precisely because of the power of the Armenian lobby that 
the US Congress passed Section 907 of the Freedom Sup-
port Act in 1992, prohibiting any US governmental assis-
tance to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis regarded this legislative 
bill as discriminatory and as a measure that punished the 
victim.
With the signing in 1994 of the “contract of the cen-
tury” between Baku and Western (including US) energy 
companies to exploit Azeri oil fields, the US presence in 
the Caucasus has become part of the geopolitical reality 
and rivalry between Washington and Moscow. The con-
struction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, 
which opened in May 2005, is another major victory for 
the White House. This pipeline, actively supported by 
both the Clinton and Bush administrations, strategically 
connects Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and ensures the 
Westward integration of Azerbaijan and Georgia.
But it was the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington and the subsequent US war 
on terror that cemented co-operation between the United 
States and the countries of the Caucasus, particularly Geor-
gia and Azerbaijan, which have sent peacekeeping forces 
to Iraq and Afghanistan and provided air bases and air 
space for US planes. They have also co-operated with the 
United States in exchanging intelligence and in the fight 
against money-laundering. 
The United States has thus become an active player in 
the region and specifically in the Nagorny-Karabakh peace 
process. Washington has supported the territorial integri-
ty of Azerbaijan, yet has also insisted that the conflict be 
resolved by diplomatic negotiations, not military means. 
The United States has sponsored a series of meetings be-
tween the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1999, 
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the most important being that between Presidents Hey-
dar Aliev and Robert Kocharian in Key West, Florida, in 
March 2002, at which a deal was nearly agreed. However, 
the negotiations ultimately proved fruitless as neither side 
was willing to compromise on the chief issue, the status 
of Nagorny-Karabakh. Despite Armenian Diaspora’s in-
fluence America, strongly interested in finding alternative 
energetic supplies for Europe intensifies its relations with 
Baku, the good example of it was cancelation of Section 
907 of the Freedom Support Act in 1992.
From the outset of the conflict, Turkey has condemned 
Armenia as the aggressor and supported its brotherly na-
tion Azerbaijan by closing its border with Armenia and re-
fusing to establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan. The 
Armenian claims about the so-called genocide of 1915, de-
mands for territorial and financial compensation, attempts 
to force the parliaments of other countries to recognize—
without proper historic study—the alleged genocide, and 
terrorist attacks by Armenian groups on Turkish diplomats 
in the 1970s and 1980s (more than seventy Turkish diplo-
mats were killed) have further impaired relations between 
the two nations.
Yerevan has been pushing for the opening of the Turk-
ish–Armenian border, a call supported by the United States 
and European Union. Ankara, however, ties such an open-
ing to the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories 
and to recognition by Yerevan of Turkey’s territorial in-
tegrity.
While Armenian–Turkish relations remain cold, 
Azeri–Turkish relations have developed fast and are close 
and strong. Ankara has provided military and economic as-
sistance to Azerbaijan and has also given it political support 
at major international summits. The BTC pipeline project 
has further strengthened ties between the two countries.
Turkey is a key power in the Caucasus and can be a 
major player in resolving the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict. 
Its opening of trade and communication links with Yerevan 
could be an important part of any peace package. Yet Tur-
key also figures as a major obstacle in the peace process, 
owing to its difficult relations with Yerevan.
Iran has taken a somewhat more balanced stance on 
Nagorny-Karabakh than Turkey: despite its Islamic iden-
tity, it has at times supported Christian Armenia over Mus-
lim Azerbaijan. Although Iran has provided humanitarian 
aid to Azeri refugees and has fostered trade and economic 
relations with Azerbaijan, it has been angered by Baku and 
Washington’s close co-operation on energy and has not 
welcomed the arrival of US companies in the Caspian Sea 
region. Neither does Iran appreciate Azerbaijan’s friendly 
ties with Israel. A further complication in Iranian–Azeri 
relations is the fact that more than thirty million of Iran’s 
populations are ethnic Azeris: Iran fears that Azerbaijan 
might plant secessionist ideas among this group.
While Iran has been somewhat excluded from the 
Nagorny-Karabakh peace process (even though at the be-
ginning of the conflict it played a mediating role between 
the warring parties), it is a major power in the region and 
any possible future peace deal will have to include Iran in 
the framework. In 2000–1, a “land-swap plan” envisaging 
an exchange of territory between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
circulated in the media of the two countries and allegedly 
featured in negotiations between their two presidents. Any 
such plan would necessarily also concern Iran, as it bor-
ders the lands of the conflicting parties. Nevertheless, Iran 
remains suspicions of peace proposals forwarded by the 
United States, because it fears they will increase US influ-
ence in the region.
EU activity in the Caucasus has so far been mostly 
economic in nature, with BP and other European energy 
giants (Elf, TotalFina, Eni) participating in energy projects 
in Azerbaijan. The European Union has also been develop-
ing the East–West transport and communication corridor 
and providing technical assistance to the three Caucasian 
nations (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) that fall within 
the framework of its Tacis Program to supply such aid to 
thirteen East European and Central Asian countries. Lead-
ing EU members Britain, Germany, France, and Italy have 
supported the territorial integrity of these three Caucasian 
nations and affirmed their intention to back peace negotia-
tions on the various ethnic and secessionist conflicts that 
afflict them. As regards Nagorny-Karabakh, France has di-
rectly participated in the peace talks as one of the co-chairs 
of the Minsk Group.
The comparative trust between the European Union 
and Russia is more likely to advance a Nagorny-Karabakh 
solution than is the bitter rivalry between Russia and the 
United States. Russia currently enjoys warm ties with Ger-
many and France, and this could assist the international 
negotiators in seeking to resolve the conflict.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Persian Gulf nations 
have supplied humanitarian assistance to Azeri refugees 
and internally displaced persons, yet this assistance has 
been accompanied by an increase of religious propagan-
da, alarming Azerbaijan’s political leaders, who are keen 
to build a secular state in their country. Azerbaijan pays 
special attention to relations with the Islamic world. The 
Organization of the Islamic Conference was the first, and 
is so far the only, international body openly to condemn 
Armenia for aggression over Nagorny-Karabakh. It has 
called for the immediate and unconditional liberation of 
the occupied Azeri territories. Islamic countries also part-
ner Azerbaijan in energy, trade and investment, thus help-
ing it to build a strong economy. Some Muslim countries, 
such as Syria and Lebanon, have also developed strong ties 
with Armenia.
Islamic countries have not directly participated in the 
Nagorny-Karabakh peace process, yet they are an impor-
tant factor in the ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus because 
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they are capable of providing large sums of money, weap-
ons and humanitarian aid to the various Islamic warlords 
in the region.
Although little active in the Caucasus in the 1990s, 
China has been increasing its role lately with greater par-
ticipation in regional energy projects and enhanced trade 
and communication ties with Caucasian countries. In 
March 2005, President Ilham Aliev of Azerbaijan travelled 
to China to develop bilateral ties.
China, with its growing economic power and military 
might, could soon be a major player in the region. In 1999, 
Azerbaijan was shocked by the transfer of eight Chinese 
Typhoon multiple rocket systems to Armenia, an act for 
which Beijing swiftly expressed official regret, blaming 
the deal on private companies. Although not a direct player 
in the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict, China has the capacity 
to become one.  (ISMAILZADE, 2005)
 
Mediation Efforts
The Main external factor involved in the conflict reso-
lution is OSEC, which is involved in the conflict resolution 
from 1990s. Nagorny-Karabakh was the first major conflict 
in which it had been involved, though it was often harshly 
criticized. The board members of OSEC are: Russia, Tur-
key, and the US. All of them have their own interest in 
the conflict and all of them have often worked at cross-
purposes.
At the meeting of all organizations involved in the 
conflict on 24 March, 1992 in Helsinki, it was decided to 
hold a peace conference. Belarus volunteered his capital 
Minsk, as a venue. So the “Minsk Conference” was born.
Despite much effort the role of OSEC appears ineffec-
tive in conflict resolution and both parties are too critical 
towards the organization. Yet some positive efforts so far 
were made. The newest effect took place in March 2011 
in Sochi, where presidents of both countries met together 
with Dmitri Medvedev acting as a hones broker. “They 
made some pleasant noises. Both parties committed to re-
solve their differences peacefully, and to implement fully 
an agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war made in 
October. They also agreed to investigate ceasefire viola-
tions, under the aegis of the OSCE. Such measures could 
restore some confidence. But they will do little more”; 
“The chances of pre-meditated war, the ICG argues, are 
slim. Both sides appear to believe that grandstanding is a 
useful negotiating tactic. The danger is that it increases the 
chances of front-line skirmishes provoking an accidental 
war. – is written in March 7, 2011 article in Economist”. 
As for mediators, it is obvious that Russia is likely to 
continue maintaining active negotiations, by exerting ef-
forts to reach any agreements between the parties. How-
ever, the U.S.’s minimal role as a negotiator is unlikely to 
change. Washington is more likely to focus on resolving 
local and global issues that are urgent to the U.S. recently, 
rather than the long-running territorial dispute in the South 
Caucasus. It also includes the NATO coalition in Afghani-
stan and the consequences of a financial crisis and the be-
ginning of the struggle for the Oval Office.
However, the only innovation can come about by en-
hancing the role of the European Union as a negotiator in 
the peace process. There are prerequisites for this. The EU 
as an institution may become the main platform for nego-
tiations. It brings together the conflicting countries in the 
Eastern Partnership program. 
The European Union as a whole can act in resolving 
the problem. It can also play a more important role in the 
Nagorny-Karabakh conflict. Brussels could become a uni-
fying element that would enhance the interest of European 
politicians in achieving stability in the Caucasus, and co-
ordinate efforts of the EU capitals in resolving the territo-
rial disputes in the region.The issue of separating the EU’s 
role from that of the OSCE Minsk Group’s becomes more 
urgent, if there is a larger role for the Armenian Diaspora 
in France and the United States in the negotiations on Na-
gorny-Karabakh. The Armenian lobby in the West plays an 
active political role in the decisions made by the U.S and 
French authorities, as opposed to those of the Russian Di-
aspora. In this context, it would be better if the EU shared 
more political involvement in the Nagorny-Karabakh set-
tlement along with the Minsk Group. The EU mediation 
can be successful, especially given the project for Euro-
pean integration, in which all the Caucasus countries are 
equally interested. The project, hampered by the lack of 
stability in the region, can become the basis for dialogue 
between the parties in the conflicts, including Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. The EU needs to be better acquainted with the 
realities of the conflict to become an active participant in 
the settlement. Many European leaders are not sufficiently 
aware of the nuances of the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict. 
They do not know about the occupation of 20 percent of 
Azerbaijani territory.” Writes Trend European Desk Com-
mentator Elmira Tariverdiyeva
According to G. Vanian (Azeri artist) “This is ideol-
ogy, whose main postulate is that Armenians and Azerbai-
janis cannot live in peace and all that’s keeping them from 
war to the better end is the strong hand of Russia, which 
the language of self-deception dubs mediation. The death 
of this ideology is important.
Future Threats
Despite the fact that some steps to negotiation are made, 
often described as “frozen” conflict of Nagorny Karabakh 
is warming up. A recent report from the international Crisis 
Group says that ceasefire violations rose by 53% last year. 
Besides Azerbaijan in cooperation with Israel is increasing 
and developing its arm supply. It is planning to become the 
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arm supplier of Caucasus and Middle East. Despite the fact 
that Azerbaijan spends more than whole Armenian budget 
on armament, Armenians are also trying their best to get as 
much weapon from Russia as possible.   In the custom line 
which is 110 miles length EUMM has only 6 peacekeepers 
when 20 000 soldiers are placed there from the both sides. 
Despite this fact both sides avoid conflict escalation, as war 
is unprofitable for both of them. Azerbaijan avoids conflict 
escalation because most part of its economy is based on 
oil. In case of new war strategic places will be heated from 
the opposite side, this will cause foreign investors to leave 
the country that will cause the huge crisis. Another factor 
is that Azerbaijan will avoid irritation of Russia.  On the 
other side Armenia, which is the winner side of the conflict 
does not have any interest to start a new war, but in case 
it will feel a serious threat caused by increased armament 
of Azerbaijan, it may make the first steps to attack, but 
in case it happens Armenia will face various insuperable 
problems: it’s army is located at a problematic geographic 
location from where they were not able to leave in 1992, 
the country will suffer from economic crisis and so on. 
In a conclusion I would state that conflict whether it is 
frozen or not should be by all means resolved peacefully. 
Even a frozen conflict may any time escalate and become 
a full scale war that will be destructive not only for the 
both sides of the conflict but for the whole region of South 
Caucasus. I would suggest both sides to realize that with-
out their willingness of active negotiations and without 
several compromises from both sides situation will remain 
frozen and even may worsen soon. Both sides should be-
come on more tough tone of speech. Experts consider and 
I agree that at the moment peaceful resolution of Nagorny-
Karabakh conflict does not seem a near perspective unfor-
tunately. It is clear that without intensive involvement and 
influence of the outside world, Armenians and Azerbaijan 
are not able to reach consensus and carry on negotiations. 
The factor of Russia should also be taken into considera-
tion. “Russia may be interested in conflict aggravation, 
which is military-political ally of Armenia Recently Russia 
and Armenia signed agreement by which Russian armed 
forces will remain in Armenia till 2044. Russia does not 
want the conflict resolution for several reasons as it is in-
terested in Azerbaijan’s gas resources; on the other hand 
it (Russia) wants to keep military-strategic superiority in 
Armenia. Because of these reasons Russia may try to strain 
the conflict in case there will appear the chances of its 
peaceful resolution not to lose its hegemony on the Region 
of South Caucasus.” – Stated military expert Mr. Mamuka 
Nebieridze in his interview with me.  (Nebieridze, 2012) 
As at the moment USA and EU face the economical crisis 
and dozens of domestic problems, plus democratic move-
ments in Middle East, the case of South Caucasus is some-
how pushed back, but the fact that EU and USA interest in 
the region is high was once again proved with the President 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Geor-
gia in the beginning of October, 2011. At the same time 
the tensed relations of Turkey and Israel may affect arm 
trade relations of Azerbaijan and Israel. I think the main 
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